当前位置: 首页>博士论文>资源详情
超市蔬菜流通价值链控制权及治理研究
中文摘要

我国是一个农业大国,农业发展关乎着整个国民经济的运行效率和运行质量,“三农”问题也是工作的重中之重,国家给予了高度的重视。蔬菜产品作为农产品重要的组成部分,社会各界也给予了广泛的关注。 随着随着经济的发展,城市居民生活方式发生转变,超市经营蔬菜产品的业态开始出现。一方面,城市规模不断扩大,蔬菜种植面积被急剧挤压,蔬菜生产开始向郊区转移,生产更为分散。同时,城市居民对蔬菜的需求量却保持持续增长。蔬菜作为生活必需品,对购买的便利性要求较高,需要有更多的蔬菜销售摊点来满足不同区域消费者的生活需求。但是,广泛布点投入较大,传统的由供应商直接投资设点进行蔬菜销售的模式已经不能适应环境的变化,这些都为蔬菜进入超市提供了前提条件。另一方面,城市居民生活节奏较快,据有关数据统计, 87.4%的上班族都是晚上下班之后购买蔬菜,因此,传统的农贸市场只是在早晨进行蔬菜贸易的业态不再能满足城市居民的消费需求。而营业时间跨度长、交通便利、购物环境较好的超市日益受到消费者的青睐,超市蔬菜产品逐渐受到关注。在这一背景下,超市经营蔬菜产品的业态应运而生。与传统的蔬菜流通组织形式不同,超市蔬菜流通减少了流通环节、缩短了流通时间,能够及时的向供应商、生产商反映市场的需求变化,方便实现蔬菜质量追溯。但是,蔬菜流通同样存在着很多的问题。蔬菜交易是一种重复性的活动,所以我们有必要对蔬菜流通价值链进行治理。同时,蔬菜流通价值链治理是社会化生产分工的必然结果,只有有效的组织和协调价值链各环节的活动,才能实现价值链各环节的共赢。 论文首先论述了研究的现实背景、理论背景,提出了所要研究问题:第一,超市蔬菜流通价值链变迁的影响因素有哪些,这些因素是如何影响蔬菜流通价值链的?对这个问题的回答,有助于我们理清蔬菜流通价值链治理的逻辑和重点。第二,超市该如何维护自己的控制权?强有力的控制权是超市有效进行价值链治理的前提。蔬菜产品差异小,有大量的生产者和销售者。在买方市场,本应该谁掌握渠道谁就掌握了控制权,但是仍有很多的零售企业控制权受到挑战,导致了蔬菜流通价值链的断裂。因此,在分析价值链治理之前,必须要明确超市应该怎样来维护自己的控制权。第三,不同类型不同背景的超市,蔬菜流通价值链的治理模式有何不同?不同的治理模式应该各自采取怎样的治理策略? 为了研究以上问题,论文采取了探索性多案例研究的方法,选取大润发超市、家乐福超市、永辉超市、杭州市萧山区农发超市和临沂市兰山区绿群超市做为案例研究的对象。多案例研究,首先要对每一个案例进行分析,深挖其价值链演变的影响因素,每条价值链上生产环节、流通环节、零售环节的特点,以及各环节之间的关系,存在的问题。其次,通过多案例分析,寻找共性。找出影响蔬菜流通价值链演变的影响因素、作用路径;总结出价值链控制权获取和维护的积极策略;找到蔬菜流通价值链治理模式划分指标。第三,将共性和特性相结合,根据蔬菜流通价值链治理模式的划分指标,对零供双方的权利差进行计算,得出不同的治理模式,并提出价值链治理的关键。最后,通过博弈论的方法,验证价值链治理的关键所在。 运用交易成本理论、资源依赖理论和分工理论对所收集的数据进行案例分析。第四章中,从超市蔬菜流通价值链构成环节的演变和零供双方角色的演变入手,总结归纳超市蔬菜流通价值链演变的趋势和影响因素,并论述影响因素对价值链演变的作用路径,为价值链治理的重点和关键点的确定提供参考。在第五章中论述了超市蔬菜流通价值链控制权获取的动车组模型。确定超市蔬菜流通价值链的治理者,是价值链能够实现有效治理的前提条件。在第六章中,根据第四章价值链演变的影响因素和第五章控制权获取的因素,重新选取了治理模式的划分指标:交易的可编码性、供应商的能力、供应商的数量、零售商转换供应商的成本。这四个指标可以分为三个部分:交易的可编码性能力,供应商权利和零售商权利。最后通过权力差的计算,在权利不平衡的基础上,得到了四种超市蔬菜流通价值链治理模式:受制型、依附性、关系型和模块型四种治理模式。论述每种模式的特点、治理机制、优缺点。 主要结论有:第一,在超市蔬菜流通价值链中,控制权并非“天然”形成且一成不变的,需要采取积极的策略,通过增加零供双方的相互依赖来获取和维护超市的控制权。第二,根据零供关系权利差的大小,划分了四种不同的治理模式:受制型、依附型、关系型和模块型。就四种治理模式而言,流通效率高较高的是模块型和受制型治理模式;信息传递效率最高的是模块型治理;零供双方合作关系较为稳定的是关系型和模块型治理模式;蔬菜供应最为灵活的是依附性治理模式;蔬菜质量把控最有效的是模块型治理模式。并且,随着时间的推移,零供双方的关系向多元化关系发展,相互渗透,相互融合,模块型治理模式逐渐为大型零售超市所接受,成为一种发展的趋势。治理模式没有好坏之分,只有适不适合,超市要根据发展阶段、规模、实力、所处的外部环境等实际情况来选择适合自己的治理模式。第三,价值链治理的关键是在维护自身控制权和利益的前提下,实现价值链各环节的共赢。因此价值链治理的重点包括:与供应商的关系维护;提高流通效率,降低流通成本;提高对蔬菜质量的控制力度;蔬菜产品运输、储藏技术创新;提高信息传递效率;进行价值链的创新;提高消费者的消费体验等。 本研究主要的创新点主要有以下几个方面:第一,从增加相互依赖的角度看待超市控制权,并构建了超市控制权的动车组模型。第二,根据蔬菜产品的特殊性,运用资源依赖理论和交易成本理论,重新选取了价值链治理模式指标: 交易的可编码能力、供应商能力(满足产品和服务需求的能力、议价能力)、供应商的数量、零售商转换供应商的成本、零售商禀赋(有形资源和无形资源)。第三,在价值链权利不平衡的前提下,通过对零供双方权利差的计算,得出了超市主导的蔬菜流通价值链四种治理模式:受制型治理模式、关系型治理模式、依附型治理模式和模块型治理模式,论述了各模式的特点,治理机制,优缺点和治理的关键。第四,运用博弈论的方法,比较零供双方在非合作博弈和合作博弈中的策略选择和收益差异,验证了合作博弈中零供双方的收益可以大于非合作博弈中的收益,并对合作博弈中如何进行利益分配进行了具体的量化。 关键词:超市蔬菜流通价值链;价值链控制权;治理模式划分指标;价值链治理模式;价值链治理

英文摘要

We are a huge agricultural country and the development of agriculture has a great influence on the efficiency and quality of the whole national economy. The problems of agriculture, the countryside and fanners are affairs that have influenced our national interest and people's livelihood all the time and also been the foundation of long-lasting stability of our country. Our government have been putting much attention to it. As an important composition of agricultural produce, vegetables are also concerned by all levels of people. With the development of our economy, citizens' lives have changed a lot and that supermarkets sell vegetables appears. On one hand, cities become bigger and bigger and vegetables land is shrinking heavily so that vegetable production start to transfer to suburbs and the production become more dispersed. Meanwhile, citizens' demand to vegetables continues growing. Vegetables are one of necessities of life so it is highly required to buy them conveniently. Therefore, more vegetable-selling places are needed to meet the requirements of customers in different areas. However, it costs a great deal to increase more places so the traditional mode that suppliers sell directly their vegetables to customers is no longer feasible. All of those make it possible for supermarkets to appear. On the other hand, people living in cities have a fast life. According to statistics, 87.4% of worker choose to buy vegetables after they are off duty so traditional fairs which usually open in the morning hardly meet the citizens' demand. Instead, supermarkets can work out well with its long business hours, convenient transport and nicer shopping environment. Under this background, supermarkets that sell vegetables emerge naturally and are being paid more and more attention. Different from traditional organizational form of vegetable distribution, they reduce the circulation and time of vegetable distribution and can offer demand change in time to producers and suppliers in order to realize quality traceability. But there still exist lots of problems in vegetable distribution. Since vegetable transaction is not a one-time but a repetitive activity so it is necessary for us to govern it. At the same time, the value-chain governance of vegetable distribution is an natural result of social division of labor. Only by effective organization and coordination of every link can a win-win result of value chain be achieved. At first, this paper discusses the current situations and theoretical backgrounds and then presents the problems. Firstly, what factors influence the value-chain evolution of supermarkets' vegetable distribution? How can these factors influence the value chain of vegetable distribution? To answer these questions helps us to clearly understand the logic and emphases. Secondly, Howe can supermarkets maintain their own leadership? After all, powerful leadership is the premise of effective value-chain governance. There is little difference in vegetable produce and there are a large number of producers in which situation it should have been whoever controls the channels controls the leadership. In reality, however, the leadership of some retail enterprises is still challenged, leading to the value-chain breakup of vegetable distribution. Hence, before analyzing the value-chain governance, we should make sure how supermarkets should maintain their leadership. Thirdly, what difference of value-chain governance mode of vegetable distribution is there in different types of supermarkets with different background? What kind of governance strategy we should take based on different governance mode? In order to study the questions above, the paper adopts exploratory multi-case study, selecting RT-Mart, Carrefour, Yonghui superstores, Nongfa supermarkets in Xiaoshan district, Hangzhou and Lvqun supermarkets in Lanshan district, Linyi as subjects of study cases. The reason why choose multi-case study is because by analyzing every case, the writer want to dig out the main factors that influence the value-chain evolution of each case and find out the features of every value chain in production, distribution and retail and their relation with each other, and problems. Then look for the common characters, figure out factors which influence the value-chain evolution of vegetable distribution and its evolution pathways, conclude the active strategy of the obtainment and maintenance of the value-chain leadership and find out the classification standards of the value-chain governance of vegetable distribution. Finally, combine those common characters with their specialties, calculate the right difference between retailers and suppliers according to the classification standards of the value-chain governance mode of vegetable distribution and find out what kind of governance mode they should use. The collected data was analyzed with "Transaction Cost Theory" "Resource Dependence Theory" and "Division of Labor". From the value-chain composition's evolution of supermarkets' vegetable distribution and role changes between retailers and suppliers, Chapter 4 generalizes the value-chain evolution's trends and influencing factors of supermarkets vegetable distribution and discusses those factors' pathways to the value-chain evolution, which provides reference to the emphases and key points of value-chain governance. Chapter 6 discusses the EMU Model of the Obtainment of the Value-Chain Leadership in Supermarkets' Vegetable Distribution and determines that the governor of value chain in supermarkets' vegetable distribution is the precondition to achieve effective value-chain governance. According to the factors in Chapter 4 that influence value-chain evolution and factors in Chapter 5 on the obtainment of leadership, Chapter 6 chooses new classification standards of governance mode: the encodability of the transaction, suppliers' ability, the number of suppliers and the cost of retailers changing their suppliers which could be divided into three parts: the encodability of the transaction, the right of retailers and that of its suppliers, right of retailers and suppliers. Finally, through the calculation of right difference, and on the basis of right imbalance, four types of value-chain governance mode in supermarkets vegetable distribution are attained: control mode, dependence mode, relation mode and module mode. It also discusses its features, governance mechanism and advantages and disadvantages of every mode. Main conclusion includes, firstly, the value-chain leadership in supermarkets' vegetable distribution do not form naturally and is not unchangeable so active measures, such as increasing the interdependence between retailers and suppliers, must be taken to obtain and maintain the leadership; secondly, according to the right difference between retailers and suppliers, four different governance modes (control mode , dependence mode, relation mode and module mode) are divided. In the four different governance modes, module and control modes have more efficient distribution, module mode has better information transmission, dependence mode has the most flexible vegetable supply and module mode has the most efficient control on vegetable quality. Besides, as time goes by, relations between retailers and suppliers are becoming diversified and different modes intertwine with each other, among which module mode has become a development trend, increasingly accepted by most supermarkets. There is no good and bad among different governance modes and the one that fits is the best so supermarkets should choose their governance mode in accordance with their practical situation, such as their development phase, scale, financial power, outside environment and so on. Thirdly, the key point of value-chain governance is to achieve a win-win results in every link under the precondition of maintaining leadership and interest. Therefore, the emphases of value-chain governance include the relations maintenance with suppliers, the increase of distribution efficiency and the lower distribution cost, the enhancement quality control of vegetables, the innovation of vegetable transport techniques and storage techniques, the improvement of information transmission, the value-chain innovation, the consumption experience and so on. Main innovations of this paper are as follows. Firstly, observe supermarket leadership from the perspective of increasing dependence with each other and also build the EMU model of the supermarket leadership. Secondly, on the basis of the specialty of vegetable produce, choose new standards of value-chain governance mode which include the encodability of transaction, the suppliers ability (including the ability of meeting the demand of products and services, and bargaining power ), the number of suppliers, the cost of retailers changing suppliers, suppliers' tangible resources and intangible resources according to "Resource Dependence Theory" and "Transaction Cost Theory". Thirdly, under the condition of unbalanced value-chain right and through the calculation of right difference between retailers and suppliers, four types of value-chain governance modes in supermarkets' vegetable distribution are obtained which contain control mode, relation mode, dependence mode and module mode and the paper also discusses the feature of each mode, governance mechanism, advantages and disadvantages and the emphases of governance. Fourthly, using the method of game theory to find the difference of strategies and profits of both sailors and suppliers between non-cooperative game and cooperative game. And then, verifying that the profits in the cooperative game for both sides be greater than in the non-cooperative game. Based on these, we calculated how to distribute the profit in the value chain. Keywords: value chain of supermarket vegetable circulation; the control power in value chain; indexes; governance patterns; the value chain governanc

作者相关
主题相关
看过该书的人还在看哪些书